Where is Europe in the eastern dimension?
Where is Europe in the eastern dimension?
The EU has entered into 2010 with new hopes and daring statements such as “Europe is back”. What do EU’s eastern neighbours think on that account? Is EU even remotely back in the troubled post-soviet vicinity? Does the Spanish Presidency, the pioneer of managing the effects of the Lisbon Treaty, even look eastwards?
Let’s start from the latter. The Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero before officially entering his role at the lead of the rotating presidency only briefly mentioned the post-soviet countries in his public appearances. At the Plenary Session of the Conference with the President of the Eur... in December 2009 Zapatero remotely referred in his speech to the eastern neighbourhood only mentioning that “our Presidency will continue to promote relations with neighbouring countries, developing the Eastern Partnership with the countries along the eastern border of the Union”. At the same time he (un)willingly emphasized the long existing competition between the Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods of EU with the reference to the “special effort” that will be put forward by the Spanish Presidency “to consolidate the Union for the Mediterranean as a forum for political dialogue and cooperation between the European Union and the countries of the southern shore”. Moreover, the genuine interest expressed by the Spanish official in approaching Russia in an environment of trust and cooperation comes as totally legitimate whereas economic and security interdependence, energy foremost, is so deeply entrenched between two partners. However, one cannot ignore the view that establishing a network of trust and cooperation with the eastern vicinity included in the Eastern Partnership can become a means of integrating Russia as well. Hardly only focusing on Russia can the EU hope to achieve in Moscow “a constructive and reliable player in the international structure”. In a post-soviet neighbourhood dominated by Russia in one way or another, the EU should not play its cards on random luck, if it really wants to be back. Interestingly enough, the Russian political analysts already predict that the Spanish presidency will be “psychologically comfortable” for Kremlin and no radical changes or critical moments are to be expected and the bilateral dialogue will take place in a positive atmosphere. The same positive attitude has been heard in the voice of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Serghei Lavrov who believes relations with Russia are a priority for Spain, which transposes into a good opportunity to increase the dynamics of the cooperation.
A new European External Action Service is to be created as part of the new Lisbon Treaty and is to be managed by the first High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/the EC Vice-President Catherine Ashton. Lady Ashton, who is to be confirmed within days by the EP, has set high goals for the new service to become a top priority, go beyond the bureaucratic exercise, and provide a coherent strategy that will give non-Europeans a reliable future. But a decision on the structure of the service will only be presented to the Council not sooner than April and how Ashton rightly observed “in our immediate neighbourhood we are expected to take a primary role” and the EU’s “wider international credibility also depends on how we interact with our immediate neighbourhood”.
What’s going on in the Eastern vicinity?
Ukraine, being the most advanced partner in its institutional relations with the EU and already negotiating an Association Agreement which embeds discussions on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, is headed towards presidential elections on 17th of January. No one expects an orange revolution anymore. East or West debates for Ukrainian politicians entering the electoral battle have now been almost in their entirety more pro-Russian or trying to take a neutral stand. Though, the EU has already stated that the conduct of democratic elections will be a crucial step in its further relations with Kiev, the two candidates to lead the battle, the current Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko and the former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, are both avoiding European Integration slogans, with the latter being rather reluctant, put mildly, on the way EU-Ukraine relations should be structured and with clear no NATO path for Ukraine. Take it or leave it, geography still matters. Only the current President still militates strongly for an EU agenda, but his days in office are limited. Many believe EU has betrayed Yushchenko for higher stakes and Moscow now runs the cards in the region. Beyond elections, the country is in a deep economic turmoil, with international loans and critical days for the national currency. The way things look today, Ukraine is headed for another term of Russian dominated domestic politics with the EU focusing its interests elsewhere.
Moldova, the next best achiever within the EU’s democracy promotion instruments towards the post-soviet area, started yesterday negotiating a new agreement with Brussels that will bear the name of an Association Agreement. However, what its content and how enhanced it could become in terms of deep free trade area or visa liberalization the perspective is far fetched. Moldova’s new democratic four party coalition (The Alliance for European Integration) government has been left with a tough legacy from the former communist authorities that were defeated in last July’s repeated elections after the 2009 post-parliamentary violent riots took place in early April on allegations of ballot fraud. Moreover, the new democratic forces failed repetitively to elect a president of the country missing on eight parliamentary votes. Under such circumstances the country is bound to head for new parliamentary elections this year, whereas the authorities in office are now trying to identify a way out of the political impasse through means of organizing a referendum and changing the Constitution in order to have the presidential elections by direct ballot rather than in the legislative body. Chisinau is struggling to overcome the consequences of the economic and financial crises and constant increases in prices to public transport, gas, electricity, gasoline have a severe impact on the population. Though the EU is desired by over 60% of the population, the nostalgia for the soviet past is strong in segments of older generations or Russian speaking population. Moreover, the country is divided in the East with a secessionist conflict where Russian troops are still present till nowadays and the EU is merely an observer to this process, while Russia holds the key to the solution.
Belarus has seen in the past year a constant swinging in its foreign policy vector. Having been for decades Russia’s best predictable little brother, more often Lukashenko seems at present to go through the EU-Russia dilemma based on where Minsk could get more economic benefits from. Therefore, the one day EU preference and another day Russia predilection keep changing places in the Minsk agenda. The inclusion of Belarus in the Eastern Partnership, launched in May 2009 during the Czech EU Presidency, has shown the ease with what a student that attended the EaP Civil Society Forum has been expelled from the university. While Belarusian authorities have denied any involvement numerous facts indicated to the official state administration being behind it. The Minsk administration has openly declared on numerous occasions that the country is only interested in the economic advantages provided by the EU’s instruments and is not keen to reform itself by an EU model.
A traditional mid-winter energy war involving Russia is also occurring this year, only not with Ukraine, but with Belarus. The tensions regarding Russian oil delivery started in December and are reaching heated statements from both sides with Russia warning to leave Minsk without preferential supply and Belarus threatening to leave the Customs Union if Moscow continues to ignore the energy interests of Minsk. After numerous failures during bilateral talks, the two parties are now taking a time-out. Meanwhile, Russia is ready to deliver without customs tax the necessary oil supply for domestic consumption to Belarus, whereas Belarus is expecting to get bigger amount to be able to sell it afterwards to EU markets and cover its budget needs. However, many in Western Europe appreciate that Russia’s actions are oriented at taking over the Belarusian oil transit system in order to gain greater influence over the EU consumers. Belarus is also entering an electoral period with local elections to be held this April and presidential elections in the beginning of 2011.
The South Caucasus has never looked too much the European direction. Georgia is the exception. At least in declarations. But is it a good one? Georgian President is not particularly popular within the country. The most recent popular wave of dissatisfaction was blasted on Saakashvili following the demolition in Kutaisi of the World War II memorial, which besides political debate; claimed two lives. Nonetheless, Georgia being in the EU focus after the 2008 war with Russia will be in the attention of the Spanish Presidency since a Spanish parliamentary delegation has already started a three-day visit in the region.
Azerbaijan has been internationally condemned on media freedom after two bloggers have been recently sent to jail following a distribution of satirical video about Azerbaijan’s political system. On frequent instances the EU has preferred to overlook Baku’s poor human rights record and concentrate on its energy interests. Azerbaijan is of particular interest to Brussels due to its oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea and possibility to become the alternative supplier for the European consumers dependent on Russian gas. Azerbaijan is also a potential transit route of resources from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Not to be overlooked by the EU is this week’s announcement made by Gazprom, Russia's state-run gas monopolist, to purchase all of the gas exported by Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani-Russian cooperation on energy dates decades back. In the existing possibility that Azerbaijan could redirect its gas operations to either Russia, Georgia, Turkey or Iran, the European Union has a rather moderate stance on the lack of democratic developments on the domestic level. Therefore, negotiations on the renewal of the 1996 Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between Azerbaijan and the European Union will foremost take into account the Union’s energy security awareness. Though disregarding the worrying freedom situation in Azerbaijan depicted by the latest Freedom in the World 2010 Report (the country classified as not free and scored 6 out of 7 on the political rights and 5 out of 7 on the civil liberties situation where 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free rating) would not give positive signals regarding the democratizing power and values of the EU.
Armenia is also following Azerbaijan’s media restraints path. In the Sunday (January 10) parliamentary by-election journalists were subjects to attempts to prevent them from covering the ballot and several media outlets even reported attacks on their staff from the responsible electoral authorities. It resembles in a light manner the early 2008 presidential elections pattern that led to violence, 10 deaths and state of emergency. Armenia is a partly free country, according to Freedom House assessment, and scored only 6 out of 7 on the political rights and 4 out of 7 on the civil liberties situation ranking. Moreover, Armenia and Azerbaijan and Armenia are still engaged in negotiations to resolve the frozen Karabakh conflict. Some positive change has been envisioned in the region due to the last year’s signature of the border-opening with Turkey, though the two parties haven’t ratified the document yet waiting for a first move from each other.
The situation at the beginning of 2010 in the eastern vicinity of the EU does present tremendous signs of trouble. Is that enough for the EU to refocus its attention to the east as well?
The EU has entered into 2010 with new hopes and daring statements such as “Europe is back”. What do EU’s eastern neighbours think on that account? Is EU even remotely back in the troubled post-soviet vicinity? Does the Spanish Presidency, the pioneer of managing the effects of the Lisbon Treaty, even look eastwards?
Let’s start from the latter. The Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero before officially entering his role at the lead of the rotating presidency only briefly mentioned the post-soviet countries in his public appearances. At the Plenary Session of the Conference with the President of the Eur... in December 2009 Zapatero remotely referred in his speech to the eastern neighbourhood only mentioning that “our Presidency will continue to promote relations with neighbouring countries, developing the Eastern Partnership with the countries along the eastern border of the Union”. At the same time he (un)willingly emphasized the long existing competition between the Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods of EU with the reference to the “special effort” that will be put forward by the Spanish Presidency “to consolidate the Union for the Mediterranean as a forum for political dialogue and cooperation between the European Union and the countries of the southern shore”. Moreover, the genuine interest expressed by the Spanish official in approaching Russia in an environment of trust and cooperation comes as totally legitimate whereas economic and security interdependence, energy foremost, is so deeply entrenched between two partners. However, one cannot ignore the view that establishing a network of trust and cooperation with the eastern vicinity included in the Eastern Partnership can become a means of integrating Russia as well. Hardly only focusing on Russia can the EU hope to achieve in Moscow “a constructive and reliable player in the international structure”. In a post-soviet neighbourhood dominated by Russia in one way or another, the EU should not play its cards on random luck, if it really wants to be back. Interestingly enough, the Russian political analysts already predict that the Spanish presidency will be “psychologically comfortable” for Kremlin and no radical changes or critical moments are to be expected and the bilateral dialogue will take place in a positive atmosphere. The same positive attitude has been heard in the voice of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Serghei Lavrov who believes relations with Russia are a priority for Spain, which transposes into a good opportunity to increase the dynamics of the cooperation.
A new European External Action Service is to be created as part of the new Lisbon Treaty and is to be managed by the first High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/the EC Vice-President Catherine Ashton. Lady Ashton, who is to be confirmed within days by the EP, has set high goals for the new service to become a top priority, go beyond the bureaucratic exercise, and provide a coherent strategy that will give non-Europeans a reliable future. But a decision on the structure of the service will only be presented to the Council not sooner than April and how Ashton rightly observed “in our immediate neighbourhood we are expected to take a primary role” and the EU’s “wider international credibility also depends on how we interact with our immediate neighbourhood”.
What’s going on in the Eastern vicinity?
Ukraine, being the most advanced partner in its institutional relations with the EU and already negotiating an Association Agreement which embeds discussions on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, is headed towards presidential elections on 17th of January. No one expects an orange revolution anymore. East or West debates for Ukrainian politicians entering the electoral battle have now been almost in their entirety more pro-Russian or trying to take a neutral stand. Though, the EU has already stated that the conduct of democratic elections will be a crucial step in its further relations with Kiev, the two candidates to lead the battle, the current Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko and the former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, are both avoiding European Integration slogans, with the latter being rather reluctant, put mildly, on the way EU-Ukraine relations should be structured and with clear no NATO path for Ukraine. Take it or leave it, geography still matters. Only the current President still militates strongly for an EU agenda, but his days in office are limited. Many believe EU has betrayed Yushchenko for higher stakes and Moscow now runs the cards in the region. Beyond elections, the country is in a deep economic turmoil, with international loans and critical days for the national currency. The way things look today, Ukraine is headed for another term of Russian dominated domestic politics with the EU focusing its interests elsewhere.
Moldova, the next best achiever within the EU’s democracy promotion instruments towards the post-soviet area, started yesterday negotiating a new agreement with Brussels that will bear the name of an Association Agreement. However, what its content and how enhanced it could become in terms of deep free trade area or visa liberalization the perspective is far fetched. Moldova’s new democratic four party coalition (The Alliance for European Integration) government has been left with a tough legacy from the former communist authorities that were defeated in last July’s repeated elections after the 2009 post-parliamentary violent riots took place in early April on allegations of ballot fraud. Moreover, the new democratic forces failed repetitively to elect a president of the country missing on eight parliamentary votes. Under such circumstances the country is bound to head for new parliamentary elections this year, whereas the authorities in office are now trying to identify a way out of the political impasse through means of organizing a referendum and changing the Constitution in order to have the presidential elections by direct ballot rather than in the legislative body. Chisinau is struggling to overcome the consequences of the economic and financial crises and constant increases in prices to public transport, gas, electricity, gasoline have a severe impact on the population. Though the EU is desired by over 60% of the population, the nostalgia for the soviet past is strong in segments of older generations or Russian speaking population. Moreover, the country is divided in the East with a secessionist conflict where Russian troops are still present till nowadays and the EU is merely an observer to this process, while Russia holds the key to the solution.
Belarus has seen in the past year a constant swinging in its foreign policy vector. Having been for decades Russia’s best predictable little brother, more often Lukashenko seems at present to go through the EU-Russia dilemma based on where Minsk could get more economic benefits from. Therefore, the one day EU preference and another day Russia predilection keep changing places in the Minsk agenda. The inclusion of Belarus in the Eastern Partnership, launched in May 2009 during the Czech EU Presidency, has shown the ease with what a student that attended the EaP Civil Society Forum has been expelled from the university. While Belarusian authorities have denied any involvement numerous facts indicated to the official state administration being behind it. The Minsk administration has openly declared on numerous occasions that the country is only interested in the economic advantages provided by the EU’s instruments and is not keen to reform itself by an EU model.
A traditional mid-winter energy war involving Russia is also occurring this year, only not with Ukraine, but with Belarus. The tensions regarding Russian oil delivery started in December and are reaching heated statements from both sides with Russia warning to leave Minsk without preferential supply and Belarus threatening to leave the Customs Union if Moscow continues to ignore the energy interests of Minsk. After numerous failures during bilateral talks, the two parties are now taking a time-out. Meanwhile, Russia is ready to deliver without customs tax the necessary oil supply for domestic consumption to Belarus, whereas Belarus is expecting to get bigger amount to be able to sell it afterwards to EU markets and cover its budget needs. However, many in Western Europe appreciate that Russia’s actions are oriented at taking over the Belarusian oil transit system in order to gain greater influence over the EU consumers. Belarus is also entering an electoral period with local elections to be held this April and presidential elections in the beginning of 2011.
The South Caucasus has never looked too much the European direction. Georgia is the exception. At least in declarations. But is it a good one? Georgian President is not particularly popular within the country. The most recent popular wave of dissatisfaction was blasted on Saakashvili following the demolition in Kutaisi of the World War II memorial, which besides political debate; claimed two lives. Nonetheless, Georgia being in the EU focus after the 2008 war with Russia will be in the attention of the Spanish Presidency since a Spanish parliamentary delegation has already started a three-day visit in the region.
Azerbaijan has been internationally condemned on media freedom after two bloggers have been recently sent to jail following a distribution of satirical video about Azerbaijan’s political system. On frequent instances the EU has preferred to overlook Baku’s poor human rights record and concentrate on its energy interests. Azerbaijan is of particular interest to Brussels due to its oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea and possibility to become the alternative supplier for the European consumers dependent on Russian gas. Azerbaijan is also a potential transit route of resources from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Not to be overlooked by the EU is this week’s announcement made by Gazprom, Russia's state-run gas monopolist, to purchase all of the gas exported by Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani-Russian cooperation on energy dates decades back. In the existing possibility that Azerbaijan could redirect its gas operations to either Russia, Georgia, Turkey or Iran, the European Union has a rather moderate stance on the lack of democratic developments on the domestic level. Therefore, negotiations on the renewal of the 1996 Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between Azerbaijan and the European Union will foremost take into account the Union’s energy security awareness. Though disregarding the worrying freedom situation in Azerbaijan depicted by the latest Freedom in the World 2010 Report (the country classified as not free and scored 6 out of 7 on the political rights and 5 out of 7 on the civil liberties situation where 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free rating) would not give positive signals regarding the democratizing power and values of the EU.
Armenia is also following Azerbaijan’s media restraints path. In the Sunday (January 10) parliamentary by-election journalists were subjects to attempts to prevent them from covering the ballot and several media outlets even reported attacks on their staff from the responsible electoral authorities. It resembles in a light manner the early 2008 presidential elections pattern that led to violence, 10 deaths and state of emergency. Armenia is a partly free country, according to Freedom House assessment, and scored only 6 out of 7 on the political rights and 4 out of 7 on the civil liberties situation ranking. Moreover, Armenia and Azerbaijan and Armenia are still engaged in negotiations to resolve the frozen Karabakh conflict. Some positive change has been envisioned in the region due to the last year’s signature of the border-opening with Turkey, though the two parties haven’t ratified the document yet waiting for a first move from each other.
The situation at the beginning of 2010 in the eastern vicinity of the EU does present tremendous signs of trouble. Is that enough for the EU to refocus its attention to the east as well?
Tags: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine
Views: 0
© 2012 Created by Arne Grauls.
